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《Sichuan Building Science》 2009-02
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Analysis of incentive mechanisms for construction projects agent under asymmetric information

XIANG Yong,TAO Xueming,WANG Yongqiang(Xihua University,Chengdu 610039,China)  
In project management,the engineering consultancies are commissioned by the owner to manage the project,from authorized start to the end of the commissioning contract,both sides have the situation of information asymmetry.Based on the basic model of the principal-agent theory,this article analysis three incentive mechanisms including the absolute performance,the different performance and the combination of the two formers under the asymmetric information,and illuminates the function of the various incentive mechanisms in the project management.
【CateGory Index】: F284
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Chinese Journal Full-text Database 1 Hits
1 YU Qing, XIE Dun\|li (School of Management, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310028, China);Choice and comparative research of motivation programs under asymmetric information conditions.[J];Journal of Zhejiang University(Sciences Edition);2001-05
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