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《Journal of Beijing Jiaotong University(Social Sciences Edition)》 2007-04
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Study of Regulatory Capture Models Based on Multiple Principal-Agent

WANG Yan1,2,LI Wen-xing1 (1.School of Economics and Management,Beijing Jiaotong University,Beijing 100044,China;2.The College of Economic and Social Development,Nankai University,Tianjin 300071,China)  
In the studies of government regulation for natural monopoly enterprises,it is a basic assumption that the regulator looks like the public advocates and defenders of the national interest.In actual operation,the regulator also is a pursuer who wants to maximize his effectiveness.This double-identity might lead to the abuse of regulatory of power by collusion with the regulated enterprises so it is acquired the interests of both sides.This is the so-called regulatory capture issue which greatly increased the incompleteness of government regulation.This paper will discuss the problem using the multiple principal-agent models under the asymmetric information,and put up the corresponding restrictive means based on the conclusion of model analysis.
【CateGory Index】: F224
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