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《Commercial Research》 2009-04
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An Analysis on the Game Behavior between Governmental Supervision and the Leading Enterprises' Responsibility Fulfillment against the Rent-seeking Background

YING Li-yan1,YAN Shu-peng2,LIU Zhong-qin1(1.School of Economics and Management,Shenyang Agriculture University,Shenyang 110161,China;2.Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences,Beijing 100081,China)  
The aim of the public financial support to agricultural industrialized leading enterprises is to increase farmers' income through leading enterprises' strength.However,with the max-profit pursuing,the leading enterprises will not choose to fulfill the responsibility of leading farmer to increase income with the asymmetrical information.Although the financial supervisory departments should implement supervision over these enterprises,against the rent-seeking background,it is possible that the finance supervisory departments accept "seeks" and fail to carry out the investigation to the enterprises.This paper analyzes this economic phenomena and the influencing factors based on the game theory so as to explore the institutional innovation to reduce the rent-seek behavior.
【Fund】: 本研究成果受辽宁省教育厅博士生访学计划基金支持
【CateGory Index】: F324.6;F224.32
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【Citations】
Chinese Journal Full-text Database 1 Hits
1 Cao Liqun;Supporting the Leading Firm:A View from Information[J];China Rural Survey;2001-05
【Secondary Citations】
Chinese Journal Full-text Database 1 Hits
1 Du Ying tang and Pan Jin;A Prototype for China's New Type of Farmers' Co-ops——a Case Study of and Theoretic Probe into the Specialized Cooperative Organizations in Beijing Suburbs[J];MANAGEMENT WORLD;2000-01
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