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《Collected Essays On Finance and Economics》 2001-06
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Incentive Mechanism Design for Deciding the Base of a Principal-Agent Contract in Case of Uncertain Future Revenue

JIA Rang- cheng, TANG Shao - xiang, DING Yuan - yao (Research Institute of Econometrics. Ningbo University, Ningbo, 315211. China)  
In the paper, it studied an incentive mechanism design model for deciding the base of a principal agent contract in case of uncertain future revenue by means of game theory analysis method to information asymmetrical problem It is of some importance for further studying the validity of "complete contract about assignment of residual claim' in principal - agent relationship of governmental capital.
【Fund】: 浙江省自然科学基金(编号GJ003);; 宁波市青年(博士)科学基金;; 浙江省教育厅科学基金资助
【CateGory Index】: F270
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【References】
Chinese Journal Full-text Database 1 Hits
1 WANG Zi-long1,2,XU Xiao-di3,XU Hao-ran2,LUO Shi-long2 (1.Nanjing University of Aeronautics & Astronautics,Nanjing 210016,China;2.Peking University,Beijing 100871,China;3.Nanjing Normal University,Nanjing 210097,China);The Dynamic Game of Information Asymmetry in Real Estate Market[J];Systems Engineering;2008-12
【Co-references】
Chinese Journal Full-text Database 10 Hits
1 SUN Li\|ming,SUN Qi\|xiang(School of Economics, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China);The Asymmetric Information Problems in Insurance Agents Management[J];Journal of Peking University(Humanities and Social Sciences);2003-01
2 LIUSheng-huan;Brand, Transaction Cost and Real Estate Brand[J];Commercial Research;2002-07
3 DAI Zhong-liang(School of Economics, Sichuan University,Chengdu 610064,China);On Principal-agent Theory[J];Commercial Research;2004-19
4 SHU Jun-hui~1,LI Jian~2(1.Polytechnic School,Chongqing Institute of Technology,Chongqing 400050,China;2.School of Applied Mathematics,University of Electronic Science and Technology,Chengdu 610054,China);Moral Hazard and Principal-Agent Model in Insurance[J];Journal of Chongqing Institute of Technology;2006-08
5 XIAO Hong (The Center of Xiamen Accounting Development, Xiamen 361000, China);On Design of Transitional Price System Under Limitation of Incentive[J];Collected Essays on Finance and Economics;2003-05
6 FAN Jianjun (Guanghua School of Management,Peking University,Beijing 100871,China);A Study on the Rules,Discretion and the Dynamic Inconsistency of Policy --A General Theoretical Framework and Its Applications[J];The Study of Finance and Economics;2003-02
7 ZHANG Hui(School of Economics,Shangdong University,Jinan 250100,China);An Analysis on Creditability Mechanism in Fraudulent Conduct——An Explanation from the OneTime Game and Repeated Game[J];The Study of Finance and Economics;2003-05
8 HUANG Zhong-yi 1, XIA Zhong 2 (1. Management Department; 2. University Office, Yuzhou University, Chongqing, 400020);Analysis of the Successful Strategy for the Quality of Real Estate[J];Journal of Yuzhou University;2002-02
9 ZHANG Fei lian,WANG Meng jun,ZHOU Ji zu,YU Hou jun (Civil Architectural Engineering College, Changsha Railway University, Changsha 410075,China);Game Theory in Quality Control of Engineering Project[J];JOURNAL OF CHANGSHA RAILWAY UNIVERSITY;2000-02
10 LI Li-jun, HU Jian-zhong, HUANG Xiao-yuan (School of Business Administration, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110004, China. );Cost Control Strategy Under Asymmetric Information[J];JOURNAL OF NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY;2004-08
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