“Market Structure” of Ownership and Optimal Debt and Inefficient Investment Behavior
OUYANG Ling 1 ,OUYANG Lingnan 1,ZHOU Hongxia 2 (1.School of Management of Shanghai JiaoTong University, Shanghai 200052,China; 2.Science and Technology Department Shanghai, Shanghai JiaoTong University, Shangehai 200052,China)
The agency cost of share ownership includes the inefficient investment behavior of manager in order to maximize the private benefit but not the firm value and the tunneling behavior of the control shareholders at the expense of the small shareholder. The paper analyzes the debt level and the monitoring cost and two types of inefficient investment behavior under different ownership “market structure” in a common analysis frame. The paper argues that there exists adverse relationship between the ownership concentrate content and the monitoring efficiency. Finally, the paper holds that the stateowned ownership should be diversified properly to improve the monitoring efficiency, and the optimal debt should be introduced to mitigate the whole agency cost.
【CateGory Index】： F275