Full-Text Search:
Home|Journal Papers|About CNKI|User Service|FAQ|Contact Us|中文
《Journal of Finance and Economics》 2007-12
Add to Favorite Get Latest Update

Executive Compensation Drives Merger and Acquisition:Evidence from Listed Companies in China

ZHANG Ming1,GUO Si-yong2(1. Institute of Accounting and Finance,Shanghai University of Finance and Economics,Shanghai 200433,China;2. School of Accountancy,Shanghai University of Finance andEconomics,Shanghai 200433,China)  
MA (Merger and Acquisition) may be the most important decision of corporate resource allocation for major executives to make,so it is necessary to find out major executives’ motives. We explore their motives in the course of MA based on the samples from 2002 to 2004. Empirical evidence shows that executives have strong motives to increase their compensation and control benefits by MA,and the motives become stronger when they are near retirement. Meanwhile we find that due to institution rigidity,executives try to increase their compensation through expansion of assets scale and addition of employees after MA,and executives compensations change with regions. All these results will contribute to the design of executive compensation contracts.
【CateGory Index】: F271;F272
Download(CAJ format) Download(PDF format)
CAJViewer7.0 supports all the CNKI file formats; AdobeReader only supports the PDF format.
©2006 Tsinghua Tongfang Knowledge Network Technology Co., Ltd.(Beijing)(TTKN) All rights reserved