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《Journal of Finance and Economics》 2008-02
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Ownership of Controlling Shareholders,Bidirectional Embezzlement of Funds and Earnings Quality

ZHOU Xiao su, ZHANG Ji xiu, TANG Yang (School of Business, Nankai University, Tianjin 300071, China)  
With the data during 20032005 of China’s listed companies, this study examines the relations among controlling shareholders, bidirectional embezzlement of funds and earnings quality. We find that the relations between controlling shareholders’ ownership and total accruals are inversed "N" curve. When controlling shareholders’ ownership is low, controlling shareholders make use of embezzlement of listed company’s funds to lower earnings quality, consistent with entrenchment effect. When controlling shareholders’ ownership is high, the relations between controlling shareholders’ ownership and earnings quality are not positive significantly. If controlling shareholders make use of embezzlement of listed company’s funds to affect earnings quality, earnings quality is low; if controlling shareholders don’t make use of embezzlement of listed company’s funds to affect earnings quality, embezzlement of listed company’s funds also lower earnings quality.
【Fund】: 国家自然科学基金资助项目(70232020;70472051)
【CateGory Index】: F830.4
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