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《Finance and Trade Research》 2004-04
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Game Analysis of Regional Control Interest between China's Central and Local Government

LI Xin-an (Henan Institute of Finance and Economics, Zhengzhou 450002)  
The game of regional economic interest between China's central and local governments is an inevitable outcome in the course of marketization reform. In the institutional change of interactive functions between decentralization reform and marketization reform, the policy that regulates interest relationship between the central and local governments has its own inevitability and systematic shortcomings, but the game will exist for a long time. To resolve the non-cooperative game behavior, it is necessary to carry out institutional innovation and quicken the reform of market economy.
【Fund】: 国家社科基金项目 (编号O1BJL0 42 )
【CateGory Index】: F224.32
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