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《Industrial Engineering Journal》 2010-03
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On the Incentive and Restriction to Agent in a Principal-Agent Relation under Information Asymmetry and Uncertainty

Gu Shui-liang1,Ju Yan-bing2,Ma Hai-yan3(1.College of Applied Nuclear Technology and Automation Engineering,Chengdu University of Technology,Chengdu 610059,China;2.School of Management,Beijing Institute of Technology,Beijing 100081,China;3.Institute of the Regional Economic,China West Normal University,Nanchong 637002,China)  
The benefit of principal and agent in a principal-agent relation is affected by the incentive and restriction to agent.Meanwhile,information asymmetry and uncertainty complicates this problem.A game theory model is presented to describe how incentive and restriction to agent affect their benefit under information asymmetry and uncertainty.With this model,it can analyze the factors that affect the contract between principal and agent quantitatively and qualitatively.Thus,an optimal incentive contract can be obtained.
【Fund】: 国家自然科学基金委员会与中国民用航空总局联合资助项目(60672180)
【CateGory Index】: F224.32;F272
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