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《China Economic Quarterly》 2006-03
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Corporate Governance and Tunneling

LEI GAO SHAOHUA HE ZHIZHONG HUANG(Shantou University)  
This paper uses unbalanced panel data to test the impact of corporate governance mechanism on tunneling.Our research outcome suggests that independent board members and balance of stockholding have no monitoring effect on tunneling.Concentration of stockholding significantly increases tunneling and stocks held by corporate managers and funds decrease tunneling.There is no obvious evidence supporting the claim that firms controlled by the state suffer more from tunneling than other types of firms.In addition,firms with corporate groups as controlling shareholders suffer more from tunneling,and information disclosure and legal protection of investors significantly affect tunneling.Lastly,competition in the product market is one effective mechanism to prevent tunneling.
【CateGory Index】: F276.6
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