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《Economic Research Journal》 2003-06
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Does the Stakeholders' Benefit of Merger and Acquisition Become Equilibrium?

Zhang Zongxin & Ji Lei (Finance Institute, Fudan University and Institute of Finance, Northeast Securities Co., Ltd.)  
The thesis applies the economics of information and game theory, establishes a dynamic game of MA to analyze the stakeholders' benefit equilibrium. In order to describe the process of behavioral subject's dynamic benefit equilibrium, we apply Rubinstein's offer-counteroffer model to explore the benefit equilibrium and its motive function in the process of MA. For the sake of explanation “the shareholders' equity loss puzzle”, we apply the risk arbitrage model under information advantage to bidding firms, to analysis the risk arbitrage compensation behind the stock market for the loss of the bidding firms' premium expenditure. Based on these principles, we apply market analysis to have an empirical study on benefit allocation of the listed companies' MA, the results reveal that it also exits “the shareholders' equity loss puzzle” in China stock market.
【Fund】: 上证联合研究计划课题“上市公司购并动因 :理论研究与实证分析”的研究成果
【CateGory Index】: F830.9
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