Full-Text Search:
Home|Journal Papers|About CNKI|User Service|FAQ|Contact Us|中文
《Economic Research Journal》 2005-01
Add to Favorite Get Latest Update

Tunneling, Propping and M&A: Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies

Li Zengquan (Institute of Accounting and Finance, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics) Yu Qian (School of Business, Renmin University of China) Wang Xiaokun (School of Economics and Finance, The University of Hong Kong)  
Basing the sample of 416 events in which listed companies merge or acquire non-listed companies in China stock market from 1998 to 2001, this article investigates the effects of tunneling or propping motives of controlling shareholders and local government to the long-term performance of listed companies. The result suggests that the MAs driven by motives of avoiding deficit or rationing shares can enhance the companies' accounting performance in short term. On the other hand, when companies have not such motives, the MAs are basically tunneling activities that will damage the companies' value but have no significant influences to their accounting performance.
【Fund】: 国家自然科学基金 (项目批准号 70 2 72 0 36和 70 4 730 5 5 )的资助 ;; 上海市重点学科课题“上市公司治理评级 :理论与实证”的阶段性成果
【CateGory Index】: F832.5
Download(CAJ format) Download(PDF format)
CAJViewer7.0 supports all the CNKI file formats; AdobeReader only supports the PDF format.
©2006 Tsinghua Tongfang Knowledge Network Technology Co., Ltd.(Beijing)(TTKN) All rights reserved