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《Environmental Protection and Circular Economy》 2011-05
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In environmental regulation,three principal parts which are the public,the regulators and the pollution discharging corporations form a relation of double entrustment and agent.It results in collaborating to seek rent,and leads to low efficient.Through building the game model,a conclusion was drawn that heightening the punishment to the regulators and the pollution discharging corporations,and decreasing the supervisory cost and increasing the supervisory success rate can reduce the possibility of cooperation.And to meet these,we should open the message of environment,smooth the supervisory channel and specially heighten the punishment to the regulators.
【Fund】: 2008年辽宁省哲学社会科学规划基金项目“辽宁经济发展中的生态环境问题研究”(L08CJL022)
【CateGory Index】: X321
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