Full-Text Search:
Home|Journal Papers|About CNKI|User Service|FAQ|Contact Us|中文
《Journal of Xi'an University of Technology》 2009-02
Add to Favorite Get Latest Update

The Game Analysis of "Violating Regulation" Chronically and Its Control

LIU Fu-chao1,2,XIE Jian-cang1(1.Faculty of Business Administration,Xi'an University of Technology,Xi'an 710054,China; 2.Wind Power Technology Center,Gansu Electric Power Corporation,Lanzhou 730050,China)  
In order to improve the control effects upon the revolt habitual violating regulations in safety production management of safety sensitive undertaking,and to reduce occurrence of accidents in safety production,the authors establish the game model for the violators against the rules and safety management personal by means of basic principles of game theory.Through the game analysis of mixed strategy of both the violators against the rules and management personal(supervisors),it comes out with such conclusions that" strengthening the management of safety supervisiors can lower the rate of rule violation occurrence of the in situ workers,and intensify the penalty of the violators against the rules.In the short-run,the rate of in situ occurrence of violating the rules can be inhibited,but in the long-run,the management personal(safety supervisors) will become lazy".Also,this paper suggests a new view to improve safety management level.
【CateGory Index】: X925
Download(CAJ format) Download(PDF format)
CAJViewer7.0 supports all the CNKI file formats; AdobeReader only supports the PDF format.
©2006 Tsinghua Tongfang Knowledge Network Technology Co., Ltd.(Beijing)(TTKN) All rights reserved