Competitive Power Market Mechanism Design Based on the Designing Economic Mechanisms Theory
XIE Qingyang;YING Liming;ZHU Yonggang;Yunnan Electric Power Test & Research Institute (Group) Co., Ltd. Electric Power Research Institute;.School of Electrical Engineering, Wuhan University;
Considering the importance and practical significance of informationally efficient for the incentive power market, this paper proposed an algorithm to design an incentive compatible and inforamtionally efficient power market mechanism. Based on the designing economic mechanisms theory, the paper constructed a competitive generation side power market mechanism with multi-GENCOs, researched the above mechanism's characteristics and verified its effectiveness through the IEEE 9-bus system simulation. Simulation results indicated that: in the mechanism, GENCOs are permitted to pursue profits maximization while the power market's resource allocation is Pareto Optimality; the mechanism is able to meet the requirements of observational efficiency, the communication efficiency and the low complexity of computing; it can preserve the privacy information of GENCOs; it is capable of encouraging GENCOs to compete with each other healthily. Hence, an incentive compatible, informationally efficient and decentralized power market mechanism can be designed based on the proposed algorithm.
【CateGory Index】： F426.61