Full-Text Search:
Home|Journal Papers|About CNKI|User Service|FAQ|Contact Us|中文
《Journal of Chongqing Normal University(Natural Science)》 2018-04
Add to Favorite Get Latest Update

Welfare Analysis of Government Subsidies via Bayes-Nash Equilibrium:A Case of Imperfectly Competitive Vertical Markets

CHEN Zhe;LIANG Shaodong;Business School,Sichuan University;  
[Purposes]Welfare analysis of government subsidies in imperfectly competitive vertical markets are investigated via BayesNash equilibrium theory.[Method]By comparing expected social welfare surplus.[Findings]It follows the framework in Asker(2008),analyzes the effect of government subsidies on final consumers and the society,and obtains the sufficient conditions for the increase on social welfare surplus being greater than government expenditure.[Conclusion]Our main results extend the corresponding results in Asker(2008)to more general cases.
【Fund】: 国家自然科学基金面上项目(No.71471122)
【CateGory Index】: F274;F810.45
Download(CAJ format) Download(PDF format)
CAJViewer7.0 supports all the CNKI file formats; AdobeReader only supports the PDF format.
©2006 Tsinghua Tongfang Knowledge Network Technology Co., Ltd.(Beijing)(TTKN) All rights reserved