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《Urban Problems》 2017-08
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The problems of Laizu in public rental housing management and its strategy for lawsuit settlement

ZENG Hui;YU Xiao-fen;  
This essay analyzes the present situation and the main reasons for the failure of prosecution of "Laizu"in the exit management of public rental housing.Based on the Evolutionary Game Theory,it constructs an Evolutionary Game Model between the tenants and the government management departments,analyzes the evolution law and evolutionary stable strategy of the behavior of government departments and the tenants,determines the best time and the optimal proportion of prosecution,and takes the public rental housing community of Lanqiaojingyuan of Hangzhou as an example to make a case analysis.The results show:that from the perspective of the expected revenue,if the ratio of the tenants who exit on time is greater than97.81%,the government should not prosecute;if in the case of much "Laizu"tenants,as long as the ratio is greater than 41.46%,the other tenants will take the initiative to opt out.
【Key Words】: public rental housing laizu evolutionary game replication dynamics evolutionary stable strategy
【Fund】: 教育部人文社会科学青年基金项目(14YJC630182)——租赁性保障性住房退出机制研究:基于演化博弈及激励理论视角
【CateGory Index】: D922.181
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