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《Contemporary Economy & Management》 2009-01
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Vertical Integration, Exclusive Dealing and Asymmetric Equilibrium in Oligopoly Competition

Guo Guixia1,Dong Baomin2 (1.Beijing University, Beijing 100871, China;2.University of Inter- national Business and Economics, Beijing 100029,China)  
It is common for multinational corporations to choose such strategies as exclusive dealing (ED) or vertical integration (VI) to compete in the host countries. The two strategies are selected out for research because of their similarities and non-substitutability. When competing as duopolists in a host country, how should the last mover response to the first mover? Can this choice help get rid of the back- wardness? By setting up a Stackelberg Model, we conclude that it is by no means accidental for the multinational corporations to have spe- cial preference towards VI or ED. And it is equilibrium through rational gaming.
【CateGory Index】: F274;F224
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