Full-Text Search:
Home|Journal Papers|About CNKI|User Service|FAQ|Contact Us|中文
《Industrial Engineering Journal》 2017-03
Add to Favorite Get Latest Update

An Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Regulation of Medical Rent-Seeking Behavior Considering Future Cost

CHEN Hairong;LI Xiaoli;XIE Tian;LI Congdong;College of Management and Economics, Tianjin University;School of Management, Jinan University;School of Economics and Management, University of South China;  
In order to analyze the influence of future cost on the behaviors of doctor and supervision department, an evolutionary game model between the government supervision department and the doctor is constructed considering future cost. Research shows that, in the case of not considering future cost and the supervision strategy not being chosen because the supervision cost of government supervision department is greater than the supervision benefit, it may eventually evolve into the stable state of the doctor choosing rent-seeking because of insufficient punishment. When the future cost is considered and its transformation reaches a certain level, it can restrict doctor's rent-seeking behavior to a certain extent.Therefore, on the basis of establishing appropriate regulation and penalty mechanisms, the government should also strengthen the management of the mobile market, reputation files and license of doctors to restrain doctors' behavior and protect the interests of patients.
【Fund】: 国家自然科学基金资助项目(71672074 71501087);; 教育部人文社科项目(14YJCZH168);; 湖南省自然科学基金资助项目(2015JJ3107)
【CateGory Index】: D630.9;R197.1
Download(CAJ format) Download(PDF format)
CAJViewer7.0 supports all the CNKI file formats; AdobeReader only supports the PDF format.
©2006 Tsinghua Tongfang Knowledge Network Technology Co., Ltd.(Beijing)(TTKN) All rights reserved