Research on quality monitoring of government procurement of public service based on analysis of optimal supervision
XU Lan;FANG Zhigeng;LI Xiaoping;School of Economics and Management,Jiangsu University of Science and Technology;School of Economics and Management,Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics;
In view of the problem of public services' quality monitoring under the condition of government procurement,a three-stage game theory model is constructed based on incomplete information,starting from the perspective of government's optimal supervision. Conclusions include that raising penalties and deducting retention of subsidies for public service providers with speculative acts could contain these organizations' undue irregularities to some extent. Meanwhile the optimal level of government's supervision is obtained,and an example is given to verify our conclusion. Accordingly,practicable strategies for public services' quality monitoring under government procurement are proposed,which will provide reference for governments' decision making.