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《World Economics and Politics》 2012-01
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State Autonomy,Central Bank Independence and International Monetary Cooperation:The Political Logic of Germany's Choice in International Monetary Policy

Tian Ye Zhang Xiaobo Tian Ye,Associate Professor,School of International Studies,Renmin University of China;Zhang Xiaobo,Research Intern,Suzhou Research Institute,Renmin University of China.  
The literature of political economy shows that government can enhance the credibility of monetary policy commitments by delegating an independent central bank to regulate it.But in political process,an independent central bank can also act as a veto-player which will restrict the autonomy of state (government).From the perspective of "structure-induced equilibria",if there is inconformity between state preference and central bank preferences,the political institution can decide which one will be converted to the authoritative behavior.Usually the institution of domestic politics can be hardly changed,and a state can alter the existing equilibria between central bank and government by participating in international institutions and negotiations,which will move towards enhancing the state autonomy.As one of the highest independent central banks,the Bundesbank feared that the European monetary cooperation would make it difficult to achieve its aim for domestic currency stability and therefore was reluctant to accept currency integration at the expense of Mark.However,German federal government has overcome the objections from Bundesbank and promoted the establishment of European Monetary System and European Monetary Union by using its informational advantages and legitimacy in the international institutions and negotiations.
【Fund】: 国家社会科学基金项目“参与国际合作机制和维护国家自主性的关系研究”(批准号:08CGJ001)的资助
【CateGory Index】: D751.6;F835.16
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