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《Mathematics in Practice and Theory》 2008-01
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Incentive,Monitoring and Collusion-proof Models of Principal-agent Problems in Public Investment Construction Market

XIE Ying1,2,HUANG Wen-jie1(1.School of Business Management,North China Electric Power University,Beijing 102206,China)(2.School of Civil Engineering,Northeast Forestry University,Harbin 150040,China)  
Asymmetrical information is common in the construction-agent system and it is very crucial to ensure government clients' benefits.Traditionally,only rigorous supervision was emphasized by government clients.However in modern principal-agent mode,above assumption is no longer valid.To solve this problem,a new management mode for government clients of the construction-agent system is presented based on principal-agent theory and optimization method.We analyze incentive contracts between government clients and contractors,and incentive contracts between government clients and professional managers respectively.Besides,the problem of collusion-proof between professional managers and contractors is profoundly discussed.Finally,novel study models are built respectively based on highly dimensional variables.
【Fund】: 国家社会科学基金资助(05CJY020)
【CateGory Index】: F283
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