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《Mathematics in Practice and Theory》 2008-21
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The Stability of the Set of Weakly Pareto-Nash Equilibrium Points

YU Xiao-jun(School of Mathematics and Statistics,Guizhou College of Finance and Economics,Guiyang 550004,China)  
We first define the weight Nash equilibrium set of multiobjective games.Then we get the relative of it and the weakly Pareto-Nash equilibrium set.Finally,we prove the stability of the weakly Pareto-Nash equilibrium set of multiobjective games.
【CateGory Index】: O225
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【Co-citations】
China Proceedings of conference Full-text Database 1 Hits
1 Liu Dehai School of mathematics & Quantitative Economics,Dongbei University of Finance & Economics;Terrorism root cause analysis based on subjective game model[A];[C];2008
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