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《Mathematics in Practice and Theory》 2018-18
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Signaling Game Model under Asymmetry Fairness-concern Information

QIN Yan-hong;WEI Guang-xing;PAN Ya-yun;School of Management,Chongqing University of Technology;School of Economics and Management,Chongqing University of Technology;  
We study the reverse retailer selection and cooperation from the perspective of signaling fairness-concern information. Firstly, we compare the profit in symmetry case and asymmetry case of retailer's fairness concern, and compute out that the supplier's profit in asymmetry case is lower than that in symmetry case obviously, leading to the adverse selection problem. Then, we establish the signaling game model with same and different signaling cost so as to effectively reveal the types of fairness concern. Finally, we prove that only when the signaling cost of retailers with different fairness concern is different, the signal transmission model can just reveal the retailer type, and thus the supplier can choose the right retailer to cooperate even in the asymmetric information case, solving the adverse selection problem caused by fairness concern.
【Fund】: 国家社会科学基金青年(16CGL017);; 国家博士后基金(2017M623011)
【CateGory Index】: F274
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