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《Journal of Systems Engineering》 2001-01
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Dynamic incentive mechanism for managers

LIU Bing,KANG Kai (School of Management,Hebei University of Technology,Tianjin 300130,China)  
Comparative Performance Information can improve the incentives and efficiency in principal agent relationships. To design the incentive mechanism,we not only regard the manager's former performance,but also refer to the other managers' performance. The manager's effort comes from the explicit incentive and two implicit incentives (the reputation effect and ratchet effect). This paper uses Game Theory to study dynamic incentive mechanism on Performance Comparison.
【CateGory Index】: F272
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