Full-Text Search:
Home|Journal Papers|About CNKI|User Service|FAQ|Contact Us|中文
《Journal of Yunnan Normal University(Natural Sciences Edition)》 2008-01
Add to Favorite Get Latest Update

Analysis the Compensation Mechanics and It's Efficiency of Firm Excessive Emission in the Condition of Tradable Emission Permits

LI Shou-de,LIU Min(Management School of Shanghai Jiaotong University;Finance School of Yunnan Normal University,Kunming 650000,China)  
When rational firms have emission right,they will emit excessively,so.How to resolve firms emit and near resident's economic losses dispute is an important research problem.In this paper,we take this dispute as a non-cooperation game theorem,and analyze the compensation mechanics and its efficiency of firm excessive emission in the condition of tradable emission permits
【Fund】: 国家自然科学基金资助项目(70273021;70573073)
【CateGory Index】: X321
Download(CAJ format) Download(PDF format)
CAJViewer7.0 supports all the CNKI file formats; AdobeReader only supports the PDF format.
©2006 Tsinghua Tongfang Knowledge Network Technology Co., Ltd.(Beijing)(TTKN) All rights reserved