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A Game Analysis on the SMEs' Group Lending Reputation Model

Xie Shiqing and Li Siguang(School of Economics,Peking University)  
Based on the examination of the reputation costs,group charateristics and operational environments of the Smalland Medium Enterprises(SMEs),this paper constructs a group lending reputation model for the SMEs to analyze how bankscould set up reputation costs to reduce credit risks by transforming the traditional loan-repayment games between banks and the SMEs into the reputation games among the SMEs themselves.This study concludes:valid reputation costs are the institutional foundations of the SMEs'group lending;reputation costs refer to the opportunity costs associated with the loss of privilege as a member conducting intra-group transactions due to default;the incentive conditions of banks endogenously define the market risk frontier;the group lending can extend the maximum market risk of bank loans;Under the multiple-player group lending,banks need to trade off between the benefits of expanding market risk limits and the shortcomings of increasing credit risks so as to determine the optimal member size of the multiple-player group lending.
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